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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 10-3656 
_____________ 
                         
PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS 
 
v. 
 
DARYL BLYDEN, 
Petitioner                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands 
(Supreme Court Criminal No. 2007-0105) 
(Superior Court Criminal No. F399/2005) 
Supreme Court Justice:  Honorable Rhys S. Hoge 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2011 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, RENDELL and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: April 19, 2011)                      
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge. 
 Daryl Blyden appeals the Virgin Islands Supreme Court’s (“SCVI”) judgment that 
upheld his conviction and sentence for, among other crimes, first-degree murder.  Blyden 
challenges the judgment on two fronts; first, the Trial Court erred in admitting evidence 
that was the fruit of an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and 
second, the Trial Court erred in allowing the previous testimony of an absent witness to 
be read into the record at trial in violation of the Sixth Amendment.  We will affirm.  
 Blyden’s first challenge is to the SCVI’s judgment to uphold the Trial Court’s 
denial of a motion to suppress evidence as the fruit of an unlawful search.  We review the 
findings of fact relating to such a challenge for clear error and our review of the law is 
plenary.  United States v. Shields, 458 F.3d 269, 276 (3d Cir. 2006).  In Terry v. Ohio, the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that a police officer may stop and frisk a suspect 
when acting under a reasonable suspicion.  392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).  Blyden argues that the 
officer did not possess a reasonable suspicion, but we disagree and his challenge on this 
ground must fail.  The officers were acting on information which was radioed from the 
crime scene only minutes after the shooting.  The radioed message was based on 
eyewitness information; with a description of the suspect and the direction from which he 
was traveling.  The Appellant was sighted within five minutes.  He matched the 
description and was seen exiting the gut and sweating.  These facts were sufficient to 
create a reasonable suspicion.  
Blyden also urges that because the officers drew their guns and handcuffed him, 
the search actually amounted to an arrest under the Fourth Amendment, requiring the 
higher justification standard of probable cause.  This argument also fails.  We held in 
Baker v. Monroe Township that “[t]here is no per se rule that pointing guns at people, or 
handcuffing them, constitutes arrest.”  50 F.3d 1186, 1193 (3d Cir. 1995).  Actually, a 
police officer may take measures “reasonably necessary to protect themselves and 
maintain the status quo” when stopping a suspect.  United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 
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221, 235 (1985).  We conclude that the officers were acting appropriately when they 
stopped Blyden with guns drawn and immediately handcuffed him, as he was fleeing a 
shooting and was likely armed.  
Blyden’s second contention is a Sixth Amendment challenge to the Trial Court’s 
decision to allow the arresting officer’s testimony from a suppression hearing to be read 
into the record after the Trial Court found that the officer was unavailable.  Our standard 
of review here is plenary.  United States v. Mitchell, 145 F.3d 572, 576 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Whether the Trial Court’s decision to admit the officer’s previous testimony was in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment is a close call.  However, if it was error to admit the 
testimony, we see any such error as harmless.  United States v. Jimenez, 513 F.3d 62, 78 
(3d Cir. 2008) (“The erroneous admission of testimonial hearsay in violation of the 
Confrontation Clause is “‘simply an error in the trial process itself’ ... [that] we may 
affirm if the error was harmless.” (quoting United States v. Hinton, 423 F.3d 355, 361-62 
(3d Cir. 2005))).   
The Supreme Court has established factors for us to consider when deciding 
whether such an admission amounts to harmless error; namely, “the importance of the 
witness' testimony in the prosecution's case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the 
presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the 
witness on material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of 
course, the overall strength of the prosecution's case.”  Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 
U.S. 673, 684 (1986).  Here, we find, just as the SCVI found, that the officer’s testimony 
was cumulative in light of the other evidence of record, there was strong evidence linking 
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Blyden to the gun and the gun to the bullets and casings recovered from the body and at 
the scene, and in light of all of this, the testimony was not very important in view of the 
prosecution’s strong case.  Therefore, any error was harmless.   
 Accordingly, we will affirm. 
